there is no hard problem of consciousness

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I don't really mind at all that I see white/gold when others see blue/black. From this error-theory view, we would still be unable to predict the right answers to physical experiments. So maybe Papineau is technically a type-B physicalist. Mental states are constituted by qualitatively simple properties (e.g. Soul is the noun, it has the consciousness property. Intuitions about whether zombies are conceivable are also subjective, based on various information inside our brains that we use to judge the matter. That I have phenomenal consciousness is the most certain thing in the world for me—far more certain than whatever theories or experiments you're citing in order to suggest otherwise. Claim: John Searle maintains that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality.". Rather than appropriating philosophers' words like "qualia" and giving them functional meanings, eliminativists reject the existence of the kind of qualia that philosophers (such as Nagel or Chalmers) have in mind. The noisiness of the consciousness discourse further contributes to the false perception that it is a mysterious and insoluble problem. It's the way things seem to a mind.

For instance, John Leslie said: "it seems wrong to treat ourselves as if we were once immaterial souls harbouring hopes of becoming embodied [...]." Both are beliefs that people just have and can't subjectively decompose.
It's not obvious that the so-called "what it's like" of experience must be some independent property rather than being a concept our brains use to refer to an emergent process in exactly the same way as our brains refer to tables and fireworks. So why keep it in our theory?   •   Back to top Some people convert to Christianity because they feel that the Gospels "speak to them". You can see your house from the inside. What if we homomorphically encrypted a simulation of your brain? I think not, because acquaintance knowledge is neither a priori nor a posteriori; it's not really knowledge at all in the conventional sense of those words. Sometimes human brains consistently fail in predictable ways. However, our inability to imagine how something is the way it is doesn’t make it a problem, hard or otherwise. Princeton University has demonstrated that an electronic circuit card can respond to human intentions. Then as we learn more, we see how the kinds of phenomenological features that we experience are deducible from underlying neural dynamics. It's not that you're mistaken about having consciousness at all. This allows for a plausible analytic reduction of phenomenal consciousness to those functional processes. The identity you declare isn't deductive. [...] do the tenses point outward to the nature and ontology of external reality or merely inward and indexically to the speaker using such tenses? I wouldn’t say consciousness as an absolute yes or no. Searle denies this, though others aren't convinced. Here are some people who have advanced what I construe as type-A views: Meanwhile, here are some adherents of type-B views. For what it’s worth, I think each of the 5 points could be challenged too. Hypothesis 1 (H1): The explanatory gap is real (which is equivalent to type-A physicalism being false, zombies being conceivable, the hard problem existing, etc.). [...] there is a sense in which any type-B materialist position gives up on reductive explanation. [28] Ellis and Lewis suggested that a second factor explains why this unusual experience is transformed into a delusional belief;[29] this second factor is thought to be an impairment in reasoning, although no definitive impairment has been found to explain all cases.[30]. From this jumble of internal information, we try to predict whether there really is an explanatory gap for consciousness or not. Nonetheless, it is a hard fact that one cannot experience another person’s consciousness directly, or even deduce its existence with certainty. I would say that "consciousness" is "stuff like what's going on to generate my thoughts and feelings", where those words are understood to be handwavy gestures, similar to a pre-scientific person looking at lightning and saying that "lightning" is "stuff like that bright, loud thing". Why was her wedding ring on her daughter's hand? His main argument resembles the "change of perspective" that I suggested earlier: What is the difference between consciousness and other phenomena that undergo an ontological reduction on the basis of a causal reduction, phenomena such as colour and solidity? Suppose we believed that Newtonian mechanics is true, and we just fail to realize what it actually predicts—e.g., we're mistaken in thinking that it allows objects to move faster than the speed of light. It is, for example, much simpler to think that nothing exists and nothing is in need of explanation than to think that our traditional views on what explananda exist are right. But I'll suggest one approach, inspired by artificial intelligence. But so what if our information processing abilities are many, many orders of magnitude more powerful than that of even our closest biological relatives? This leads us to believe in qualia as "extra" properties that aren't reducible. I am a model that is aware I’m typing, I’m aware I have a headache, I’m a bit hungry, etc. I don't see why the vague cluster of confusion that characterizes our notions of consciousness couldn't be shown to be functional upon clarification. This further contributed to the illusion in the minds of many that consciousness poses uniquely difficult and insoluble problems. The people who see it as white/gold aren't even wrong, they're just implicitly using different information inside their brains to judge how to "see" the image. They just have them. Too bad there isn’t a reliable enough best test we could use to rule in/out the differentials in philosophy! Notify me of follow-up comments by email. This relates to whether they find the hard problem of consciousness compelling. Likewise, even if we can't imagine how qualia are necessarily just functional, we can still believe that proposition because of other compelling arguments. We tend to behave as though our conscious selves have agency. However, the analytic functionalist disputes this. Our "unconscious" brain seems to store a probability distribution over models that explain our sense data. Chalmers (1997): "even if type-B materialism is accepted, the explanatory picture one ends up with looks far more like my naturalistic dualism than a standard materialism. S/he can classify new objects as cars or not based on their similarity to the existing cluster along various dimensions. Sign in Of course, the mind-body problem is far older than Nagel or even than Descartes, but a lot of the specific machinery that philosophers use to debate these ideas (such as modal arguments, zombies, etc.) But we can be mistaken about what the nature of consciousness is, including whether its reduction differs from or is the same as reductions of other processes like digestion, volcanic eruptions, or weather patterns. If we don’t trust reports and turn to some other property as criterial, we are back to response #1. In any case, it's not clear there are really "consciousness facts" over and above physical facts. This seems to me like cheating. I can't defeat that fundamental intuition, but I'm trying to defuse it by showing that another perspective is possible. Consciousness is not derived but fundamental and all entities have it. It's third-person if we only see it, hear of it, or imagine it.

These computer programs model things too, just not that much. While the "consciousness dust" proposal is not much more ontologically complex than physicalism and does allow for the possibility of zombies (i.e., zombies are copies of you that lack consciousness dust), this proposal doesn't provide many dualist desiderata. Of course we don't call them "hard problems" because they're not hard. Things would not go well for the relationship at all. It is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how and why it is possible to be you. It seems just preposterous that the speed of light should be the same in all inertial reference frames (call it the "anti-relativity hunch").g. Following is a hypothetical dialogue between types A and B: A: What is "consciousness"? You can probably see where this is going. Also, Papineau (2003) seems to advance a "phenomenal concept strategy" argument, and those are typically associated with type-B physicalism.
It is irrelevant to any possible science of consciousness. One counterargument might be that physics has made some progress already—gradually converging toward a theory of everything, slowly but surely unifying seemingly disparate phenomena.

Determining whether a given thing is conscious requires more than just knowledge of physics because consciousness is not merely defined in structural/functional terms but has to be empirically correlated with structural/functional properties (such as through research on the neural correlates of consciousness). So it should come as no surprise that we are sometimes disproportionately vexed by the presence of our own consciousness. Phenomenal experience is different because this requires shifting from third-person to first-person, which is a switch that no other scientific reduction needs. Philosophers tend to think that if you can put a name on something, it's a thing that you can describe in a third-person way. This is why there. This definition is given in both Bible and Vedas. But saying it doesn’t actually make it so, and without proof of agency there can be no hard problem of consciousness. End of story. From the perspective of the HPC, a single experience of a flash of light is as mysterious as a full human experience of a summer’s day or the most profound mystical experience of the most enlightened monk. Your email address will not be published. Years later you learn that a car is made of parts: Engine, body, seats, steering wheel, etc. And what if we hid the only copy of the decryption key, let’s say in another galaxy? We also develop computational theories to understand why certain types of functional information processing make good sense as candidates for what we had been more vaguely pointing to as our phenomenal experiences. Most likely, more than an impairment of the automatic emotional arousal response is necessary to form Capgras delusion, as the same pattern has been reported in patients showing no signs of delusions. Conceivability: Try conceiving of a B-zombie, a world where A facts obtain and B facts don't.

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